Working on the first north stream pipeline. Image (2011): bair175 / cc by-sa 3.0
Where rhetorically the european solidarity is demanded, it is all about interests and friendships
The project nord stream 2, with the natural gas of russia to be transported to western europe, is realized or even blown down? To this question, this day in germany is violently. A contribution in the faz has continued to increase the debate. In a guest contribution of the conservative newspaper, 7 meps from germany write that a question of the project is a question of european solidarity.
"The plan to build a second russian gas pipeline through the baltic sea to germany, the eu splits politically and asks our solidarity with poland, our baltic neighbors, slovakia and ukraine, but also with danemark and sweden", write the eu politicians of union, fdp and grunen.
Signed the contribution the european politician manfred weber (csu), reinhard butikofer (grune), nadja hirsch (fdp) and the bundestag meps norbert rottgen (cdu), oliver krischer (grune), michael link (fdp) and the influential union deputy in the eu parliament elmar brock. Is addressed directly in the post the spd: you throw the author, "rhetorical europe not enough to live up", but "at this point where it is concretely", solidaritat miss.
What strikes the post is the use of unclear definitions. Because an unbiased reader will first ask why it is one "desco administration of europe" should be when natural gas from russia, which is spent also part of europe, is delivered to another part of the continent. Since it is essentially more understandable if the us-augustister tillerson power against the pipeline mobile.
Finally, it is not necessarily in the us geopolitical interest, if within europe a new energy cooperation out without it. But tillerson also uses the european rhetoric when he warns of a danger of energy security in europe. Tillerson looked at a polenary visit and it was easy to explain that the resistance of the two countries is born against the pipeline of common strategic interests (see the eu’s own gas infrastructure, even behind the jerking of the openness).
Two different russia concepts in german aufenpolitik
It falls more in the field of ideology, if it is highlighted that russia has been considered since the crimean annexion of countries like poland and the balticum as a large threat. The resistance to north stream 2 has much more economic reality.
Poland still covers two-thirds of its demand by russian gas and deserves like ukraine on the forwarding of the fuel towards western europe, including germany. Nord stream 2 was dealt by poland and ukraine and poland were missed the transit costs.
In addition, poland castle in november 2017 a long-term agreement with the united states for the delivery of flux gas (lng) and has invested in an lng terminal on the baltic sea custody. How should the policy of germany react to these different interests?
Behind this are different european conceptions, which the fruh deceased historian reinhard opitz has investigated primarily.
Coarse parts of the spd rather put on a kind of peaceful coexistence with russia. They resort to concepts, as they have been discussed for a long time before the october revolution in parts of german politics. On the other hand, the concepts that are in scharfer front position to russia have been developed for a long time before 1917.
The eastern european states and the russian map
Currently put on a belt of nation states in the east of europe, which are mainly from domestic grounds the antirous card. Only these states are neither a monolithic block, such as the frequent binational quarrels between poland and ukraine, nor is the ratio to russia primarily a sequence of russian-soviet vacuum.
Rather, in addition to economic interests, there is always indoor political interests. Thus, the hungarian legal government has a fairly relaxed ratio to russia under putin and the czech republic has re-elected a prasident, the value on good relations with russia lays.
With both countries, political events, which were referred to as hungarian uprising in 1953 and as prague fruhling in 1968 and were more likely to suspect russia, if one ames that the ratio to russia depends on the experiences with soviet-russian power policy depends on.
Poland, on the other hand, had reasoned from his historical experiences of the occupation after 1939, a dominance of germany to fear. A special role, ukraine occupies as protege germany and after 1945. Finally, germans and ukrainian nationalists had to experience the common experience that their power was once gripped massively through the red army.
Germany has linked to an old german-ukrainian cooperation when establishing the current ukrainian regime. If the 7 german politicians for their arguments against the project nord stream 2 also took on the interests of these ukraine, they provide a history forunt at the day, which has been observed since the maidan events in germany.
From grunen like rebecca harms to the former aufemister westerwelle, there was little scruple, with the old rights of federal federal federal fences that were on the maidan with flags and slogans to cooperate. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the guest contribution, a covenant of politicians of the union, the fdp and the greats has come together.
This only makes it clear that a common government of these parties is not bursting in sub-political ies. Rather, the joint statement shows that such a covenant has quite a future.
It is about different geological and economic interests. The rhetoric about the cohesion of europe is there only an ideological fog candle. Since the crimension of russia is stranded, blob to not talk about geopolitics and economy.